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PEOPLE V. WROTTEN: THE NEED FOR
STATUTORY REGULATION OF THE USE OF
TWO-WAY LIVE VIDEO TESTIMONY IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
BRITTANY GURRIERIt
INTRODUCTION
A. Two- Way, Closed-Circuit Video Testimony for Unavailable Witnesses in
Criminal Trials
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]."I The Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized this right as a guarantee that the defendant
will have a face-to-face meeting with his or her accuser before the trier of
fact, and has found this to be one of "the core [] values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause." 2 The New York State Constitution is no different.3
However, both the United States Supreme Court and the New York Court
of Appeals have made exceptions to this guarantee of face-to-face
confrontation through the use of closed-circuit, live televised testimony in
certain, limited situations. 4
t J.D., May 2011, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Towson University.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
2 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157
(1970)).
3 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed
to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . . and be confronted with the witnesses against him
or her.").
4 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990) (concluding that the Confrontation Clause does
not necessarily prohibit the use of closed-circuit, live televised testimony when it is necessary to protect
a child witness from trauma caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant); see also
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In New York, most of the cases dealing with the use of this procedure
involve vulnerable child sexual abuse victims as witnesses providing
testimony against the accused. 5 In fact, the use of this procedure has been
codified in Article 65 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 6 However, what
happens when the witness is not a vulnerable child, but rather an elderly
person who moved out of state following an assault and is no longer
available to testify due to poor health? What happens when there is no
statute to lay out the ground rules for using two-way, closed-circuit live
television conferencing to obtain the testimony of this elderly witness?
And more importantly, who should decide when this procedure should be
allowed, the judiciary or the Legislature? These are the very issues that
were raised in People v. Wrotten.7
B. Wrotten: The Need for Statutory Regulation
In People v. Wrotten, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court
was vested with the authority, through both its inherent powers and
Judiciary Law§ 2-b,,8 to fashion a procedure for, and allow the use of, two-
way, closed-circuit live television to obtain the testimony of an elderly,
complaining witness who could not travel to New York to testify against
the defendant due to advanced age and poor health. 9 The Court of Appeals
recognized that "[t]elevised testimony requires a case-specific finding of
necessity,"o and that "it is an exceptional procedure to be used only in
exceptional circumstances."11 However, the court did not lay out any
standard to be followed by trial courts in determining when this procedure
can be used or what safeguards need to be in place to protect the
defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation.
People v. Cintron, 551 N.E.2d 561, 567 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that under both the United States
Constitution and the New York State Constitution face-to-face confrontation with the accused is not
always required).
5 See Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at 565 (discussing the use of live closed-circuit, two-way television for a
five year old victim's testimony against the accused); see also People v. Algarin, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977,
978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (exploring the issue of whether sexually abused child victims should be able
to testify by live closed-circuit television).
6 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10(2) (2011) ("When the court declares a child witness to be
vulnerable, it shall . . . authorize the taking of the testimony of the vulnerable child witness from the
testimonial room by means of live, two-way closed-circuit television.").
7 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that permitting an elderly man to testify via live,
two-way television did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights).
8 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 2-b (2011) ("A court of record has power ... 3) to devise and make new
process and forms of proceedings, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed
by it.").
9 Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1100.
10 Id. at 1103.
11 Id.
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This comment will examine People v. Wrotten through a public policy
lens. In coming to its decision in Wrotten, the court found that "[n]owhere
does Craig 2 suggest that it is limited to child witnesses or that a 'public
policy' basis for finding necessity must be codified."' 3 This may be true;
however, there are important public policy reasons suggesting that the use
of this procedure, outside of what has already been provided for through
Article 65, should be codified. Included in the reasons for codification are
safeguarding the confrontation rights of the defendant, 14 protecting the
well-being of the witness, 15 streamlining standards for application of the
procedure,16 maintaining the separation of powers between the branches of
the government,17 and ensuring the just resolution of criminal cases.
C. Overview
Part I of this comment will provide background on the Confrontation
Clause, and the relevant case law and statutes involving the use of live,
closed-circuit video conferencing for obtaining witness testimony in both
the federal judicial system and in New York. This section will also discuss
the differences in using this procedure for both available and unavailable
witness testimony. Part II will explore the facts and procedural history, as
well as the testimonial procedure at issue in People v. Wrotten. Part III will
identify the problems with Wrotten's application of the procedure for
allowing the use of two-way, closed-circuit live television testimony, and
will propose legislation aimed at remedying those problems.
12 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
13 Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1103.
14 See id. at 1102 ("Live two-way video may preserve the essential safeguards of testimonial
reliability;" however, it is essential that "all of the other elements of the confrontation right [be]
preserved, including testimony under oath, the opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, and
the opportunity for the judge, jury, and defendant to view the witness's demeanor as he or she
testifies.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46.
15 See Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1103; see also Craig, 497 U.S. at 854.
16 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980), because the test set forth in Roberts was inconsistently applied by lower courts, and "so
unpredictable that it fail[ed] to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation
violations."); see also Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1106 (Jones, J., dissenting) (identifying the problem of
individual courts, on similar facts, reaching different conclusions as to whether to allow the admission
of televised testimony).
17 See N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. 1995)
("The constitutional principle of separation of powers ... requires that the Legislature make the critical
policy decisions, while the executive branch's responsibility is to implement those policies.").
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I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. The Confrontation Clause
The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in
lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
may ... judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief18
The Supreme Court has recognized "two essential elements in the
Confrontation Clause: (1) the right of the accused to confront the witness
and (2) the right to cross-examination."1 9 The text of the Confrontation
Clause, however, is unclear as to whether or not actual physical
confrontation is required, and Supreme Court precedent on this issue offers
conflicting interpretations. 20 Supreme Court cases have interpreted the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause to guarantee the defendant a
face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact. 21
Moreover, the Court has identified this face-to-face confrontation right as
"essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution." 22 This right of a criminal
defendant to confront accusatory witnesses serves two purposes: (1) to
deter false accusations; and (2) to give the jury the opportunity to examine
18 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
19 Aaron Harmon, Child Testimony Via Two- Way Closed Circuit Television: A New Perspective on
Maryland v. Craig in United States v. Turning Bear and United States v. Bordeaux, 7 N.C. J. L. &
TECH. 157, 163 (2005); see Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43.
20 Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (finding an exception to the face-to-face
meeting guarantee), with Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (stating that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with the witness); see Matthew J. Tokson,
Virtual Confrontation: Is Videoconference Testimony by an Unavailable Witness Constitutional?, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (2007) (explaining how, on one hand, the Court has said the clause guarantees
a "face-to-face" meeting with the witness, while on the other hand the Court has held that the clause
does not require in-person confrontation with witnesses in all circumstances).
21 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016-17 (quoting Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) in
describing the operation of the Confrontation Clause: "a fact which can be primarily established only by
witnesses cannot be proved against an accused . .. except by witnesses who confront him at trial, upon
whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he
may impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules governing the trial or conduct of
criminal cases"); see also Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43.
22 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)). In explaining the
effect face-to-face confrontation has on the integrity of the witness' testimony, the Court recognized
that "[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back."' Id. at
1019.
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the witness as the witness accuses the defendant, and to examine the
defendant as he is being accused. 23 This confrontation in front of the jury
allows the jurors to assess the credibility of the testimony, which is crucial
to a reliable verdict. 24 However, the Court in Coy v. Iowa25 explained that
the confrontation rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment are not
absolute, and may give way when necessary to further an important public
policy. 26
B. Creating an Exception to Face-to-Face Confrontation: Child Witnesses
in Sexual Assault Cases
a. Maryland v. Craig: One-Way Closed-Circuit Testimony
The Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig made it clear that a criminal
defendant's rights to confrontation are not absolute.27 The Court
established a two-prong test, now known as the "Craig Test," which
provides that a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause are not
violated, despite the absence of an in-person confrontation at trial, where
"denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy and where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." 28
In Craig, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting a six-year-
old girl who attended the kindergarten and prekindergarten center owned
and operated by the defendant. 29 Prior to trial, the prosecutor sought to
invoke a Maryland statutory procedure that allowed a child witness, who is
alleged to be a victim of child abuse, to testify from outside of the
courtroom via one-way closed-circuit television, which would be
transmitted into the courtroom. 30 Under this procedure, the child witness,
prosecutor and defense counsel would be moved to a separate room, while
the judge, jury and defendant remained in the courtroom. 31 From the
23 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019; see also Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation
Clause, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1003, 1011 (2003).
24 Chase, supra note 23, at 1011 ("The information that the jurors acquire as a result of seeing this
confrontation can help them to assess the credibility of the testimony of the accusing witness which, in
turn, is crucial to a just and reliable jury verdict."); see also Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20.
25 487 U.S. at 1012 (holding that the use of a large screen placed between the defendant and two
child witnesses testifying against the defendant in a sexual assault case violated the defendant's
confrontation right).
26 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-21. The Court, however, did not identify what would be a legitimate
exception to the right of face-to-face confrontation.
27 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 840.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 841.
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separate room, the child witness would be examined and cross-examined,
while a video monitor recorded and displayed the witness's testimony to
those in the courtroom. 32 Throughout the course of the testimony, the
defendant would be in electronic communication with defense counsel, and
objections would be made and ruled on as if the witness were testifying in
the courtroom.33 During the testimony, the witness would not be able to see
the defendant. 34
Under the Maryland statute, to allow the use of this procedure, the trial
court had to "determine that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom
will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the
child cannot reasonably communicate." 35 Expert testimony was presented
explaining that the child witness would have considerable difficulty
testifying in the defendant's presence and would not be able to
communicate effectively. 36 The trial court allowed the use of the
procedure, and overruled the defendant's objection that it violated her
constitutional right to confrontation. 37
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Maryland statute.
The Court identified four purposes of the Confrontation Clause: (1)
physical presence of the witness; (2) requirement that the witness's
testimony be under oath; (3) cross-examination of the witness by defense
counsel; and (4) observation of the witness's demeanor by the jury. 38 The
Court found that despite the witness not being physically in the courtroom,
the presence of the other elements of confrontation, such as being subject to
rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that
accorded to live, in-person testimony, adequately ensured the reliability of
the testimony. 39 Moreover, the Court recognized the compelling state
interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of child
abuse victims. 40
The Court explained that although "the Confrontation Clause reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,"41 it is a preference that
32 Id
33 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 842 (1990).
34 Id. at 841.
35 Id. at 840-41 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989)).
36 Id. at 842.
37 Id. (concluding "that although the statute 'take[s] away the right of the defendant to be face to
face with his or her accuser,' the defendant retains the 'essence of the right of confrontation,' including
the right to observe, cross-examine, and have the jury view the demeanor of the witness").
38 See id at 845-46; see also Chase, supra note 23, at 1017.
39 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,851 (1990).
40 See id at 852.
41 Id. at 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
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''must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of an individual case." 42 The Court held that in order to infringe
upon a defendant's confrontation rights, there must be a case-specific
showing of necessity to further an important state interest,43 and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. 44
b. People v. Cintron: The Constitutionality of Article 65
Similar to the issue decided in Craig, in People v. Cintron45 the New
York Court of Appeals had to determine whether Article 65 of the Criminal
Procedure Law could be construed to afford the minimum protections for a
criminal defendant's confrontation rights required by both the New York
and Federal Constitutions. 46 The Article 65 procedure provides for the use
of live, two-way closed-circuit television,47 rather than the one-way
procedure at issue in Craig.48 Like in Craig, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute under either the
New York or Federal Constitution. 49 In Cintron, the defendant was
convicted of first-degree attempted sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse
of a four-year-old girl.SO During the trial, the court issued an order pursuant
to Article 65 allowing the child witness to testify from a testimonial room
located outside of the courtroom. 51
42 Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
43 See id. at 855-56 (To meet the requisite finding of necessity the trial court must determine: (1)
that the use of one-way closed-circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the
particular child witness testifying; (2) that the particular child witness would be traumatized, not by the
courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant; and (3) that the emotional distress suffered
by the child would be more than de minimus.).
44 See id. at 855; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (holding that cross-
examination is required to admit prior testimonial statements of witnesses who have become
unavailable for trial); see also United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11 th Cir. 2006) (positing
that "[b]ecause Defendants were denied a physical face-to-face confrontation with the witnesses against
them at trial, we must ask whether the requirements of the Craig rule were satisfied, justifying an
exception to the physical face-to-face confrontation requirement of the Sixth Amendment; . . . under
Craig, such testimony may be offered only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an
important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured") (internal
quotation marks omitted); see generally Marc Chase McAllister, Two-Way Video Trial Testimony and
the Confrontation Clause: Fashioning a Better Craig Test in Light of Crawford, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
835, 836-37 (2007) (discussing the Craig reliability balancing test, and the need to replace that test
with a cross-examination requirement in light of Crawford).
45 People v. Cintron, 551 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 1990).
46 See id. at 563-64.
47 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.00(4) (2011) ('"Live, two-way closed-circuit television' means a
simultaneous transmission, by closed-circuit television, or other electronic means, between the
courtroom and the testimonial room in accordance with the provisions of section 65.30.").
48 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990).
49 Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at 567.
50 Id. at 563.
51 Id.
370 JOURAL OF CIVIL RIGHS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:2
Under Article 65, in certain child sexual abuse cases, vulnerable child
witnesses are permitted to testify via two-way, closed-circuit video from a
room that is separate from the courtroom. 52 In order to invoke the statute,
the trial court must declare the child to be a vulnerable witness and
determine by "clear and convincing evidence that it is likely, as a result of
extraordinary circumstances, that such child witness will suffer severe
mental or emotional harm if required to testify at a criminal proceeding
without the use of live, two-way closed-circuit television;" and the court
must also find "that the use of such [television procedure] will help
prevent, or diminish the likelihood or extent of, such harm." 53 For the child
witness to testify outside of the presence of the defendant, in the
testimonial room, there must be an additional, specific finding by the trial
court that having the defendant and witness in the same room during the
testimony will increase the likelihood that the vulnerable child witness will
suffer severe mental or emotional harm. 54 Moreover, the trial court may
only allow the use of this procedure if it "'is satisfied that the child witness
is vulnerable, and that, under the facts and circumstances of the particular
case, the defendant's constitutional rights to an impartial jury or of
confrontation will not be impaired."' 55
In Cintron, the Court of Appeals found that in applying the presumption
of constitutionality, Article 65 was constitutional on its face, so long as
C.P.L. § 65.20(10)56 was read in conjunction with C.P.L. § 65.10(1), which
52 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10(2) (2011) ("When the court declares a child witness to be
vulnerable, it shall . . . authorize the taking of the testimony of the vulnerable child witness from the
testimonial room by means of live, two-way closed-circuit television."); see also Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at
564 ("Article 65 . . . authorizes, in limited circumstances, the use of live two-way closed-circuit
television as a method of permitting certain child witnesses to give testimony in sex crime cases from a
testimonial room - a room which is separate and apart from the courtroom.").
53 Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at 564 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10(1) (2011)).
54 See id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.20(12) (2011)).
55 Id. at 564-65 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.20(11) (2011)).
56 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.20(10) (2011) ("The court may consider, in determining whether
there are factors which would cause the child witness to suffer serious mental or emotional harm, a
finding that any one or more of the following circumstances have been established by clear and
convincing evidence: (a) [t]he manner of the commission of the offense of which the defendant is
accused was particularly heinous or was characterized by aggravating circumstances[;] (b) [t]he child
witness is particularly young or otherwise particularly subject to psychological harm on account of a
physical or mental condition which existed before the alleged commission of the offense[;] (c) [a]t the
time of the alleged offense, the defendant occupied a position of authority with respect to the child
witness[;] (d) [t]he offense or offenses charged were part of an ongoing course of conduct committed by
the defendant against the child witness over an extended period of time[;] (e) [a] deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument was allegedly used during the commission of the crime[;] (f) [t]he defendant has
inflicted serious physical injury upon the child witness[;] (g) [a] threat, express or implied, of physical
violence to the child witness or a third person if the child witness were to report the incident to any
person or communicate information to or cooperate with a court, grand jury, prosecutor, police officer
or peace officer concerning the incident has been made by or on behalf of the defendant[;] (h) [a] threat,
express or implied, of the incarceration of a parent or guardian of the child witness, the removal of the
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requires a showing of vulnerability on the part of the child. 57 The Court of
Appeals interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Coy "as permitting the
use of closed-circuit television technology where: (1) an appropriate
individualized showing of necessity is made and (2) the infringement on
defendant's confrontation rights is kept to a minimum." 58 Under this
framework, the Court of Appeals concluded that Article 65 provided
sufficient limitations and safeguards to meet the minimum requirements of
the New York and Federal Constitutions. 59 The court found that when the
statutory standards are followed precisely, including the limitations and
protections, and the requirements that the technology provide all of the trial
participants with an adequate opportunity to evaluate the witness's
testimony, the constitutional standards can be met. 60 The Court also
recognized that although the statute does not specify that a hearing is
required to determine the vulnerability requirement, and does not require
that expert testimony be presented, the high threshold established by the
statute to protect the defendant's confrontational rights will ordinarily
require testimony at a hearing so the court can determine whether the
individualized necessity requirement for vulnerability has been met.6 1
c. Two-Way Video Testimony for Non-Child Witnesses
i. United States v. Gigante
In United States v. Gigante, the defendant, a boss of one of the New
York mafia crime families, was tried and convicted in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York of racketeering in
child witness from the family or the dissolution of the family of the child witness if the child witness
were to report the incident to any person or communicate information to or cooperate with a court,
grand jury, prosecutor, police officer or peace officer concerning the incident has been made by or on
behalf of the defendant[;] (i) [a] witness other than the child witness has received a threat of physical
violence directed at such witness or to a third person by or on behalf of the defendant[;] (j) [t]he
defendant, at the time of the inquiry, (i) is living in the same household with the child witness, (ii) has
ready access to the child witness or (iii) is providing substantial financial support for the child
witness[;] (k) the child witness has previously been the victim of an offense defined in article one
hundred thirty of the penal law or incest as defined in section 255.25, 255.26 or 255.27 of such law[;]
(1) [aiccording to expert testimony, the child witness would be particularly susceptible to psychological
harm if required to testify in open court or in the physical presence of the defendant.") (emphasis
added).
57 Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at 566.
58 Id. at 567.
59 Id. at 567-68 (distinguishing Article 65 from the statute at issue in Coy because Article 65
provides for a two-way simulcast of the child's testimony, which minimizes the curtailment of the
defendant's rights, and also requires an individualized showing of necessity for use of the procedures
based on clear and convincing evidence).
60 Id. at 568 n.6.
61 Id. at 571.
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violation of the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act) statute, RICO conspiracy, conspiracy to murder, an extortion
conspiracy, and a labor payoff conspiracy. 62 In this case, the witness was
not a vulnerable child, but rather a terminally ill, older man in the witness
protection program.63 This witness was essential to the prosecution's case;
however, as he was dying of cancer, the witness could not testify in court
due to his failing health.64 The defendant challenged his conviction on the
ground that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when
the district court allowed a government witness to testify from an
undisclosed location via two-way, closed-circuit television. 65
The Second Circuit, in Gigante, was the first court to deal with the issue
of two-way video conferencing outside of the child-protection context.66
The Court refused to apply the Craig test in its analysis, explaining that the
Craig test only applied to one-way video testimony.67 In distinguishing
Gigante from Craig, the Second Circuit held that the two-way video
procedure allowed for "face-to-face confrontation" with the defendant, and
that the procedure preserved all the key elements of in-court testimony. 68
The Court compared the two-way video procedure with the constitutionally
sound Rule 1569 for deposition testimony and argued that the video
testimony provided greater constitutional protection to the defendant's
confrontation rights, and was therefore constitutionally permissible. 70 The
Court further held that the use of two-way video testimony was
constitutional because the trial court made a finding of "exceptional
circumstances" in accordance with the Rule 15 standards, which includes
witness unavailability.71
62 United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1999).
63 Id. at 79.
64 Id.
65 Id
66 See Michael R. Rocha, Going Too Far in United States v. Yates: The Eleventh Circuit's
Application of Maryland v. Craig to Two-Way Videoconferencing, 36 STETSON L. REv. 365, 376
(2007); see also Major Michael R. Holley, "It Was Impossible to Get a Conversation Going, Everybody
Was Talking Too Much:" Synthesizing New Developments in the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause, 2006 ARMY LAW. 1, 8 (2006).
67 See Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81 (positing that it was unnecessary to identify a particular important
public policy that was advanced by allowing the witness to testify from a remote location via two-way
video conferencing).
68 Id. at 80-81 (citing the constitutional elements to the right to confront an accuser: sworn
witness; subject to cross-examination; having testified in full view of jury, court, and defense counsel;
and testimony under the eye of the defendant).
69 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (governing when deposition testimony may be taken prior to trial to
preserve testimony for trial in exceptional circumstances).
70 See Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81.
71 See id; see also FED. R. CRuM. P. 15(a)(1); and Tokson, supra note 20, at 1593.
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ii. United States v. Yates
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Yates,72 also dealt with the
issue of allowing two-way closed-circuit television for non-child
witnesses.73 In Yates, the defendants were tried for various fraud-related
offenses in the Middle District of Alabama. 74 Prior to trial, the prosecution
moved to allow two witnesses in Australia to testify via live, two-way
video conferencing on the grounds that they were unwilling to travel to the
United States to testify and were outside of the subpoena power of the
court.75 No hearing was held to determine the necessity of the procedure. 76
The trial court, over the defendants' objections, granted the Government's
motion, finding that the Government had asserted an "important public
policy of providing the fact-finder with crucial evidence ... and that the
Government also has an interest in expeditiously and justly resolving the
case."7 7 The defendants were found guilty, and appealed on the ground that
the use of the two-way video testimony violated their confrontation rights
under the Sixth Amendment.78
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Government's argument that
the standard applied in Gigante should be followed, and found that Craig
supplied the proper test for the admissibility of two-way videoconference
testimony. 79 The court noted, "[t]he Second Circuit stands alone in its
refusal to apply Craig."o The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the
Government's argument that the admission of video testimony is within the
inherent powers of the trial courts. 81 In applying Craig to the facts of Yates,
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that although there is an important
Government interest in presenting the fact-finder with crucial evidence, the
need for testimony via videoconference to prove a case and expeditiously
resolve it is not the type of public policy that is important enough to
72 438 F.3d 1307 (1 Ith Cir. 2006).
73 Id. at 1309.
74 Id. at 1309-10.
75 Id. at 1310. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the trial court allowed the use of the procedure based
only on the Government's assertions that the Australian witnesses would not travel to the United States
for trial. Id. at 1315-16.
76 Id. at 1315.
77 Id. at 1310.
78 United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006).
79 See id. at 1313. The Eleventh Circuit went on to explain that had the district court in Gigante
applied the Craig test, "its necessity standard likely would have been satisfied; to keep the witness safe
and preserve the health of both the witness and the defendant, it was necessary to devise a method of
testimony other than live, in-court testimony and other than a Rule 15 deposition." Id.
80 Id at 1313-14.
81 See id. at 1314-15.
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outweigh the defendant's rights to confrontation, especially when the Rule
15 deposition procedure is available. 82 The court found that the trial court
made no case-specific findings of necessity, other than that the Government
would find it convenient to present testimony via two-way
videoconference. 83
II. CASE HISTORY OF PEOPLE V. WROTTEN
A. Pre-Trial and Trial
In People v. Wrotten, the defendant was indicted for assault in the first
degree and two counts of robbery in the first degree. 84 The defendant was a
home health aide who briefly cared for the complainant's wife until the
wife moved into a nursing home.85 The defendant maintained a relationship
with the couple, and two and one-half months after the wife moved into the
nursing home, the defendant went to the complainant's house. 86 Both the
defendant and the complainant testified that the defendant helped the
complainant prepare snacks to bring to the complainant's wife. 87 An
altercation occurred, although the testimony regarding the altercation
differed drastically between the complainant and defendant. 88 The
complainant testified that the defendant hit him on the back of his head
with a hammer, and then demanded, and took, money from him before
leaving the house.89 The defendant testified that the complainant grabbed
her breasts, and that to get his hands off her, she grabbed something and hit
him with it.90 The defendant denied demanding, or taking, any money from
the complainant.91
After the incident, but before trial, the complainant moved to
82 See id. at 1316.
83 See id. (reasoning "[i]f we were to approve introduction of testimony in this manner, on this
record, every prosecutor wishing to present testimony from a witness overseas would argue that
providing crucial prosecution evidence and resolving the case expeditiously are important public
policies that support the admission of testimony by two-way video conference"); see also Lynn
Helland, Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 719, 747 (2002)
(arguing that two-way video testimony is efficient and necessary in the prosecution of international
crime, which often requires the testimony of foreign witnesses).
84 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
91 Id.
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California.92 Pre-trial, the prosecution moved to have the complainant
testify on commission under CPL § 680.20.93 In the Bronx County
Supreme Court, Justice Barrett denied the People's motion on the ground
that the examination on commission procedure was only available upon
defense application.94  However, Justice Barrett granted the People's
application for a conditional examination under C.P.L. § 660.20.95 The
conditional examination, however, was not possible either, because the
examination was required to be conducted in New York, and the
complainant was unable to travel. 96 Thus, the People suggested that the
conditional examination be done in New York via real-time two-way video
transmission of the complainant's testimony from California. 97 Justice
Barrett denied the People's application to conduct and record the
examination pre-trial, but decided that the two-way testimony would be
allowed if given live at trial.98 Justice Barrett reasoned that the procedure
would pass both prongs of the Craig test, and recognized that there was
already a similar procedure in place under Article 65.99 He also determined
that although Article 660 required that the proceeding be conducted in New
York, it was silent as to the physical location of the participants.1oo
Furthermore, Justice Barrett determined that the trial court had the inherent
power, under Judiciary Law § 2-b(3), to create a procedure such as this to
ensure the integrity of the trial and because the only alternative to allowing
the televised testimony would be the dismissal of the charges against the
defendant.101 A hearing was ordered to determine whether the People could
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was a factual necessity
to permit the use of live, two-way televised testimony of the
complainant.102
The hearing was held in the Bronx County Supreme Court before Justice
Silverman. 103 Both the prosecution and the defense offered expert
92 Id.
93 Appellant's Brief at 3, People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009) (No. 0199-09).
94 Id
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 4.
99 Appellant's Brief at 5-6, People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009) (No. 0199-
09).
100 Id. at 4.
101 Id. at 6 (Justice Barrett determined that the circumstances in this case would pass the second
prong of the Craig test because the People had alleged a case-specific necessity for invoking the
procedure).
102 Id. at 7.
103 Id. at 1.
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testimony regarding whether the complainant was physically capable of
flying from California to New York to testify at trial.104 Justice Silverman
determined that the People had established by clear and convincing
evidence that the complainant was unable to travel to New York - the
complainant was eighty five-years-old, frail, unsteady on his feet, and had a
history of coronary disease - without seriously endangering his health, and
thus, found that the complainant was unable to testify live in New York.10 5
Accordingly, the court permitted the People to present the complainant's
testimony via live, two-way television conference from a courtroom in
California. 106 The complainant's daughter accompanied him as he testified
from California, and she was in the courtroom during his testimony.' 0 7 An
employee of the company providing the two-way video equipment was also
present to assist with technical matters.10 8 As a result, the complainant gave
live, televised testimony, while physically in California.109 The
complainant could see the courtroom, including the Judge and the
defendant, although the extent to which he could see the courtroom
participants was in dispute, and he could hear the proceedings in the
courtroom.1 10 Those in the courtroom in New York could see and hear the
complainant.'11 Ultimately, the defendant was convicted of one count of
assault in the second degree.112
B. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
On appeal, the defendant's main argument was that the Supreme Court
erred in permitting the complainant to give televised testimony.113 The
Appellate Division, First Department, held that the trial court did not have
the authority to allow the use of the two-way televised testimony procedure
in light of the legislative intent behind allowing the procedure under Article
65.114 The court reasoned that the Legislature crafted Article 65 to allow
the use of two-way video testimony in only the narrow circumstances
104 Id. at 7-12.
105 People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (N.Y. 2009).
106 Id.
107 Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 7-8, People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. Aug. 28,
2009) (No. 0199-09).
108 Id. at 8.
109 See People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28,29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
110 Id
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 29-30.
114 See id. at 31.
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prescribed by the statute for vulnerable child sexual assault witnesses. 115
According to the First Department, the facts and circumstances in Wrotten
made it distinguishable from Craig and Cintron because in the latter cases
the abridgement of the defendants' rights to confrontation was authorized
by statutes reflecting the Legislature's critical public policy choices. 116 The
Appellate Division also found the trial court's reliance on § 2-b(3) of the
Judiciary Law to be misplaced. 117 It determined "that the scope of the
Judiciary's inherent powers must be appraised in the context of a
constitution providing that '[t]he legislative power of this state shall be
vested in the senate and assembly."' 118 Moreover, the appellate court
reasoned that to allow the trial court to make critical policy decisions
would violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers.119
The Appellate Division next discussed Wrotten's claim that the
procedure violated her constitutional right to confront the witness testifying
against her. Although the court did not decide the case on federal
constitutional grounds, it did opine that the defendant was denied a
valuable component of her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.120 The
court explained, "[i]n our judgment, in the absence of express legislative
authorization, depriving defendant of a face-to-face meeting with her
principle accuser - indeed, the person whose testimony was necessary for
the prosecution to make out a prima facie case - tainted the fairness of the
trial."121 The Appellate Division reversed the defendant's conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial. 122
C. Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed.123 It held that Judiciary Law § 2-b(3)
gave the Supreme Court the authority to utilize the procedures as
"necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by
[it]," and thus, fashion a procedure to allow the use of two-way, closed-
circuit television conferencing for testimony of an unavailable witness. 124
115 See People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
116 See id.
117 Id at 34.
118 Id. at 36 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1).
119 See id. at 38; see also Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. 1995) (discussing how
the principle of separation of powers requires the Legislature to make policy decisions).
120 Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44.
121 Id. at 44.
122 Id
123 People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (N.Y. 2009).
124 Id. at 1101 (quoting N.Y. JUD. LAW § 2-b (2011)).
2012] 377
JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGH7 & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:2
The Court reasoned that by enacting Judiciary Law § 2-b(3), the
Legislature explicitly authorized the courts' use of innovative procedures,
and held that courts may fashion necessary procedures consistent with
constitutional, statutory, and judicial law.125 The Court held that there is no
specific statutory authority expressly indicating legislative policy that
would forbid a trial court from fashioning such a procedure.126 The Court
also found that none of the statutes that provide for the preservation of pre-
trial testimony 27 implicitly precluded the use of live video testimony
during trial.128 Since the New York Criminal Procedure Law does not
enumerate the exclusive instances when two-way, closed-circuit live
televised testimony can be used, the Court explained that the trial courts are
not precluded from "exercising [their] authority to utilize necessary,
extrastatutory procedures." 29 Quoting the Appellate Division's dissent, the
court stated, "[i]n the absence of direction from the Legislature, Supreme
Court retained discretion . .. to determine what steps, if any, could be taken
to permit this prosecution to proceed notwithstanding the complaining
witness's inability to be physically present in the courtroom."l 30
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the use of this procedure
under the circumstances did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights
to confrontation.131 Basing its reasoning on the holding in Cintron, the
court explained that the authorization and use of the two-way, closed-
circuit television in this case would pass the Craig test so long as there
were findings of necessity and reliability made by the trial court. 132 So
125 See id.; see also People v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1337-1338 (N.Y. 1989) (stating that a
trial court has the authority to empanel two juries, despite clear statutory references to a single jury and
no statutory authorization for multiple juries).
126 See Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1101.
127 See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 680.10-680.80 (2011) (governing the procedure for
obtaining out-of-state witness testimony by commission); and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 660.10-
660.60 (2011) (providing procedure for obtaining pre-trial testimony via conditional examination).
128 See Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1102.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1103 (quoting People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)); see
generally Marc Bloustein, A Short History of the New York State Court System, in SEMINAR ON THE
UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1985). At the Constitutional Convention of
1846, the Supreme Court became the first statewide court of complete and original jurisdiction in New
York. Lesser trial courts, with limited subject matter and geographical jurisdiction, were given
constitutional status at the same time. It was not until 1962 that the Judiciary Article was added to the
New York State Constitution, elaborating on the structure of the court system, but still remaining
somewhat vague and open-ended with respect to its basic grant of authority. This is significant because
the Supreme Court has enjoyed broad historical powers since before the creation of the Judiciary Law.
Considering this history, there remains an unaddressed question of whether the Court of Appeals would
have acknowledged such a broad discretionary power if this ad hoc procedure had originated in a lesser
trial court, such as the New York City Criminal Court, rather than in the Supreme Court.
131 See Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1101.
132 See id. at 1102.
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long as the trial court's finding of necessity was supported by clear and
convincing evidence, the first prong of the Craig test would be satisfied.133
With respect to the public policy prong, the Court opined that two-way
video testimony can be used to protect the well-being of a witness who
cannot physically travel to New York to testify in court, while at the same
time satisfying the public policy of justly resolving criminal cases where,
as here, the defendant's confrontation rights have been minimally
impaired.134 Moreover, the Court determined that the second prong of the
Craig test was satisfied, since "all the other elements of the confrontation
right" were preserved.135 It found that the traditional indicia of reliability
for testimony in this case were all present, in that the testimony was given
under oath, there was opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination,
and the judge, jury and defendant had the opportunity to view the witness's
demeanor as he testified.136
Judge Jones, in his dissent, stated, "[i]n the absence of any express
legislative authorization, the trial court here lacked the inherent authority to
permit the complainant to testify from California via live two-way
television." 37 He argued, much like the Appellate Division majority, that
because the Legislature created Article 65 with "painstaking detail" to
allow the use of this procedure in narrowly tailored circumstances,
Judiciary Law § 2-b(3) cannot be interpreted as a grant of authority for the
trial courts to allow such testimony.138 Judge Jones questioned the
majority's holding because if the trial courts had the inherent authority to
authorize the use of two-way, closed-circuit televised testimony on an ad
hoc basis outside of Article 65, then "there would have been no need for
the Legislature to enact Article 65 in the first place." 39
Judge Jones went on to attack the majority's decision based on the first
prong of the Craig test, in that if allowing such testimony furthered an
important public policy, then the majority overstepped its boundaries by
making a policy decision that the Legislature had not yet made.140 In sum,
Judge Jones identified three main problems with the majority's view of the
courts' inherent powers: (1) there are no limitations set on the courts'
133 See id ("Nowhere does Craig suggest that it is limited to child witnesses or that a 'public
policy' basis for finding necessity must be codified.").
134 See id. at 1103.
135 See id at 1102.
136 See id.
137 People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (N.Y. 2009) (Jones, J., dissenting).
138 See id at 1105.
139 Id. at 1105.
140 See id.
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inherent power to allow the use of this procedure; (2) there is no standard
for the courts to apply, thus leaving open the possibility for individual
courts, on similar facts, to reach different conclusions about when this
procedure can be used; and (3) there is an invasion of the constitutional
province of the Legislature to determine what is an important public policy
and to create rules.'41
Judge Smith joined Judge Jones's dissent, but wrote separately to
address the Confrontation Clause issue. 142 He found that the defendant was
denied her constitutional right to confrontation, and that there was no
adequate excuse for the denial. 143 Rejecting the holding in Gigante, Judge
Smith concluded that the defendant was denied her right to "confront" her
accuser, finding that two-way television did not satisfy the face-to-face
aspect of the Confrontation Clause.144 Moreover, he distinguished Wrotten
from Craig and Cintron, concluding that the public policy of protecting
child victims in sexual assault cases is a much more compelling reason for
allowing an exception to the right of confrontation than the facts in
Wrotten.145 Judge Smith further noted that there were several other ways to
conduct the hearing to avoid a constitutional violation of the defendant's
right to confrontation, regardless of whether those options were available
under New York's current statutory schemel 46
III. THE USE OF TWO-WAY, CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION NEEDS TO BE
STATUTORILY REGULATED.
In light of the decision by the Court of Appeals in Wrotten, there needs
to be a legislative response that considers the public policy concerns of
both the prosecution and the defense in a case with facts and circumstances
such as were present here. Legislation is necessary to control how and
when the procedure of allowing two-way, closed-circuit televised
testimony from an unavailable witness can, and should, be used outside of
the Article 65 setting. Moreover, the Legislature must create statutory
standards to ensure the procedure's consistent application, and that it passes
constitutional muster on both the state and federal levels. This statute
141 See id. at 1106.
142 People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1106 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting).
143 See id
144 See id.
145 See id. at l107.
146 See id. (suggesting that instead of bringing the witness to New York, the defendant could have
been brought to California and the deposition or conditional examination of the witness could have
taken place in California with the defendant present).
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would basically function as an extension and combination of Articles 65,147
660,148 and 680149 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
A. Invoking the Procedure
The use of two-way, closed-circuit live televised testimony during trial
should be available to both the prosecution and the defense. To invoke the
procedure on either side, there needs to be a showing of reasonable cause to
believe that the witness possesses information material to the criminal
proceeding.150 Requiring the party requesting the procedure to meet this
requirement will ensure that both the time and resources of the court and
parties are used efficiently. Allowing the prosecution to invoke the
procedure furthers the important public policy interest of providing the fact
finder with all of the crucial evidence in the criminal proceeding, as
discussed further below. The statute should also allow a defendant to
invoke the procedure when needed, as it is important that this procedure not
function to deprive a criminal defendant of his or her due process rights. 151
If a defense witness possesses exculpatory evidence, the defendant must
have an opportunity, equal to that of the prosecution, to present the
witness's testimony to the trier of fact. Although the court in Wrotten
allowed the procedure to be used by the prosecution based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, 152 even though there was no express statutory
authority for it, the Legislature should develop a statute that would
explicitly make this procedure available to both the prosecution and the
defense.
B. Passing the Craig Test
"The constitutional principle of separation of powers ... requires that the
Legislature make the critical policy decisions . . . ."153 Under this principle,
it is the role of the Legislature to determine what the important public
147 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (2011).
148 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 660.10-660.60 (2011).
149 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 680.10-680.80 (2011).
150 See § 660.20; see also People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) ("Under
article 660, either party may obtain an order directing the examination of a witness conditionally if the
witness possesses information material to the criminal action or proceeding .... )(internal quotation
marks omitted).
151 See § 680.10; see also People v. Carter, 333 N.E.2d 177, 180 (N.Y. 1975) (limiting the
defendant's right to utilize examination on commission to "exceptional circumstances" because it
infringes upon the fact finder's ability to observe witness demeanor).
152 See generally People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2009).
153 Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. 1995).
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policies are, and for the Judiciary to decide if those public policies are
compelling enough to pass the first prong of the Craig test. Based on the
facts and circumstances provided in Wrotten, the Government had an
important interest in providing the finder of fact with crucial evidence, and
also an important public policy interest in keeping witnesses safe. Similar
to the important interest in protecting the mental health and wellbeing of a
vulnerable child, there is also an important policy interest in not subjecting
elderly or extremely ill adults, who have been the victims of crimes, to the
risk of serious physical injury, or even death, just to have their testimony
heard. In light of these important policy interests, the Court of Appeals
correctly decided Wrotten under Judiciary Law § 2-b(3). However, the
Legislature must structure the statute so that the second prong of the Craig
test could be met by assuring the reliability of the testimony, despite the
lack of actual, in-person confrontation. In this regard, the Court of Appeals
came up short by merely affirming the inherent powers of the trial courts to
fashion such a procedure. It is not enough to say "[t]elevised testimony
requires a case-specific finding of necessity; it is an exceptional procedure
to be used only in exceptional circumstances,"1 54 because it leaves the trial
courts with no clear standard to follow and increases the risk that the
procedure will be applied inconsistently throughout the state.
If the Legislature determines, as this comment urges it should, that there
is an important public policy interest achieved by allowing extremely ill
witnesses to testify, out-of-state, via live two-way video conferencing
because travelling to New York to testify would place them in serious
physical peril, then the Legislature must create a standard to be followed by
all courts that would properly safeguard a defendant's rights by assuring
reliable testimony. In allowing the trial courts to fashion such a procedure
on an ad hoc basis, the Court of Appeals decision in Wrotten may result in
unconstitutional violations of a defendant's right to confrontation.
Procedures that involve risks to a defendant's constitutional rights need to
be standardized and consistent so that a defendant in one court will receive
the same procedural safeguards as a defendant in another court; protections
that creating procedures on an ad hoc basis does not provide. Moreover,
this procedure, because it involves the curtailment of defendants' rights,
needs to be narrowly tailored to achieve a specific public policy interest.
By creating a clearly defined statute with rules, standards, and a uniform
procedure, the Legislature would essentially address the potential problems
154 Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1103.
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highlighted by Judge Jones in his dissent.15 5 The statute should not allow a
trial court to determine that two-way closed-circuit video testimony may be
used simply because the witness is unavailable or out of the reach of the
court's jurisdiction.156
C. Hearing Requirement
It is necessary for the Legislature to require that a hearing be held, either
prior to trial or at the time the issue arises, to determine if two-way closed-
circuit video testimony is necessary. This determination should be based
on whether or not the witness would potentially suffer serious physical or
emotional injury, serious detriment to health, or death if required to travel
to testify. The standard of proof in making this determination should be
clear and convincing evidence, with the burden of proof resting on the
party seeking to invoke the procedure.1 57 If this standard cannot be
satisfied, the use of live, two-way, closed-circuit televised conferencing
should not be allowed to obtain the testimony of the witness.
D. Requirement for an Official of the New York Courts to Be Present at the
Time the Testimony Is Given
One of the biggest problems with the procedure used in Wrotten was that
it did not provide for any official of the New York courts system to be
present in the courtroom with the complainant while he was testifying.'58
155 Id. at 1106 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's view of the courts' inherent powers
presents a number of problems. First, there does not appear to be any discernable limitation, within the
inherent powers of the courts, on a court's authority to allow the admission of an absent witness's
televised testimony as long as it is 'necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed
by [the court] . . . ' Second, what happens when individual courts, on similar facts, reach different
conclusions as to whether to allow the admission of televised testimony or some other subject
pertaining to the State's public policy? Third, it appears that the majority's ruling effectively
circumscribes the Legislature's role by allowing trial courts to (a) determine issues with public policy
implications on a case by case basis and (b) create procedural rules for the sole purpose of allowing
prosecutions to proceed (in direct contravention to state law).") (citation omitted).
156 See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315-16 (1lth Cir. 2006) (finding that the
Australian witnesses' unwillingness to travel to the United States for trial was not a sufficient reason to
permit those witnesses to testify by two-way video conference) see also Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1103
(noting that "[t]elevised testimony requires a case-specific finding of necessity; it is an exceptional
procedure to be used only in exceptional circumstances").
157 See People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (App. Div. 2008) (The trial judge held a hearing
using the clear and convincing evidence standard.); see also N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 65.10(1) (2011)
(This statute applies a clear and convincing evidence standard in establishing whether a "child witness
will suffer serious mental or emotional harm if required to testify at a criminal proceeding without the
use of live, two-way closed-circuit television . . . .").
158 Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 32. The defendant objected that no New York court attorney or any
other New York judicial official was present in the room in Califomia to supervise the proceedings and
make sure that the witness was not improperly communicating with anyone during the televised
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By not having a New York court official present, there is no way of
knowing whether the procedures required by the statute are properly
adhered to, and this may put into question whether the defendant's
constitutional rights are truly being protected. The Legislature should
require that either a Deputy Clerk or a Law Secretary be present in the
courtroom with the witness, to act as an additional safeguard preventing the
witness from being coached or coerced during the examinations. It is
important that the New York official be a member of the bar because of the
ethical responsibilities imposed on attorneys, which will further help to
ensure a fair proceeding.159 Thus, the statute should include a provision
that requires a court official to travel to the location where the witness will
be testifying, and the expense of this additional safeguard should fall on the
party invoking the procedure.160
In addition to having a New York official present, there should be a
defined procedure with regard to who can administer the oath to the
witness. C.P.L. § 680.60 provides the rules for establishing a commission
to obtain out of state testimony from a witness, who may serve on the
commission, and who may administer the oath.161 The Legislature should
establish a similar procedure to address who may administer the oath when
out-of-state, live-televised testimony is obtained. Furthermore, having the
court subscribe the names and addresses of the witnesses, the name of the
person or persons authorized to administer the oath, and a statement
authorizing said person or persons to do so keeps the record clean and
increases accountability for the procedures of obtaining the testimony.162
testimony. Id.
159 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0(1.15) (2011) (Lawyers who violate the
rules of professional conduct face sanctions and penalties, which include the possibility of disbarment.);
see also In re Friedman, 609 N.Y.S.2d 578, 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The court disbarred an attorney
for soliciting and requesting a witness to give false testimony at a trial and standing by when another
witness gave material false testimony which the attorney knew to be false. Id.
160 Cf FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. Rule 15 provides for the procedures governing pre-trial depositions. Id.
Particularly, subsection (d) explains the procedures for expenses when the rule is invoked. Subsection
(d) provides: "If the deposition was requested by the government, the court may - or if the defendant is
unable to bear the deposition expenses, the court must - order the government to pay: (1) any
reasonable travel and subsistence expenses of the defendant and the defendant's attorney to attend the
deposition; and (2) the costs of the deposition transcript." Id.
161 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 680.60 (2011).
162 Cf id. (requiring the court to subscribe to the name and address of each witness, the name of
commissioners authorized to conduct the examination, and a statement authorizing the commissioners
to administer an oath to witnesses).
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E. Technological Requirements
Additionally, a provision similar to C.P.L. § 65.30(4)163 should be
included to ensure that a criminal defendant's constitutional rights are
protected. In Wrotten, for example, there was a factual dispute as to the
extent to which the witness could see the courtroom participants during the
testimony. 164 Unless the live, two-way, closed-circuit television equipment
can provide clear transmission of the proceedings in both the courtroom
and the testimonial location, the testimony should not be allowed.
Moreover, a requirement that the live feed be recorded on videotape and
introduced into the record would allow an appellate court to review it if a
claim concerning the testimony were raised on appeal, as was the case in
Wrotten. By having a recording of the live feed as part of the record on
appeal, the appellate court would be better able to determine if the
defendant's confrontational rights were in fact violated.
CONCLUSION
In light of the changing times and advancements in technology, it is not
surprising that the criminal justice system and its procedures are also
changing. The use of two-way, closed-circuit live televised testimony
during criminal trials is a prime example of employing those advancements
in the pursuit of justice. If statutorily regulated, the procedure is an
effective method for presenting unavailable witness testimony during trial
since it allows the trier of fact to see the witness as examinations are
conducted and determine whether or not the witness is credible.
By enacting a statute that delineates the procedures and requirements
that must be met before allowing the use of two-way, closed-circuit
television to obtain the testimony of unavailable witnesses, the
constitutional right to confrontation can be satisfied. Furthermore, a statute
would ensure that the procedure used would be fair and consistent
throughout the courts. It would further serve to ensure that the prosecution
would be able to present evidence before the trier of fact under
circumstances that would normally result in dismissal, while still ensuring
163 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.30(4) (2011) ("Notwithstanding any provision of this article, if the
court in a particular case involving a vulnerable child witness determines that there is no live, two-way
closed-circuit television equipment available in the court or another court in the county or which can be
transported to the court from another county or that such equipment, if available, is technologically
inadequate to protect the constitutional rights ofthe defendant, it shall not permit the use ofthe closed-
circuit television procedures authorized by this article.") (emphasis added).
164 People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
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that defendants' rights are protected, regardless of where in New York their
trials take place. Moreover, it would reduce the need for the trial courts to
make critical policy determinations, which are better left in the hands of the
Legislature.
